Public International Law Part III is a series of recorded academic talks, and it sounds like one. A presenter thanks the people who issued the invitation, points to slides the listener cannot see and works through a paper from premise to conclusion. Several speakers say outright that the talk comes from an article or paper, sometimes one still being finished. The subjects cluster around war and what follows it. One speaker sets out a method at the start: when a problem is hard, it helps to see how earlier lawyers tried to solve it. That leads back to the Brussels Declaration, which never became binding, and to the Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907, which took up its language almost verbatim. The same talk turns to enforcement. States are ultimately the ones who hold each other to the law, the speaker notes, and some, Russia among them, seem unmoved by criticism. A second lecture happened to fall on May 8, the eightieth anniversary of the end of the war in Europe, a date that figures in its material. Its central claim runs against intuition. War zones, the speaker contends, are rarely lawless and are more often crowded with competing law, and informal courts in prisoner-of-war camps are part of the evidence. An audience question about child soldiers draws out the story of a camp trial that a Life magazine reporter happened upon. The talk closes on the idea that law is also a register of meanings and a claim of identity, and that good lawyers should not dismiss those dimensions as mere politics. Other talks stay closer to doctrine. Two presenters take aim at lesser-evil reasoning that recasts mass displacement as humanitarian. They draw on tribunal case law that treats coercion, not only physical force, as enough to make a departure forcible. Their verdict on a choice between survival and leaving home is blunt: it is not a genuine choice. Speaking a month into 2025, another presenter looks toward a special tribunal for aggression concerning Ukraine. The argument is that aggression is wrong because of the killing and destruction it brings, not merely because one state has wronged another. In 'A Weapon Is No Subordinate. Autonomous Weapons and the Scope of Superior Responsibility', the usual tests for effective control are called anthropocentric, because they were built for relationships between people. The proposed fix for the responsibility gap is technical specification and human control rather than a new reading of criminal law. Money gets its turn too, in a survey of very large awards across investment arbitration, human rights judgments and claims between states. The vocabulary assumes some grounding in the field. The reward is hearing a full argument assembled, qualified and defended by the person who wrote it.