As Ukraine Stumbles and Russia Advances, What Does it Mean?

·21 min·1 clip

Ukraine anticipates North Korean troops as expendable forces in Kursk, testing Russia's new battlefield laboratory.

1. War on the Rocks host Ryan Evans interviews Michael Kaufman, a researcher just returned from his seventh trip to Ukraine, for an assessment of the battlefield and Ukraine's strategic position. 2. The two guests are Ryan Evans, founder of War on the Rocks, and Michael Kaufman, a researcher specializing in Russia and Ukraine who conducts regular field research trips. 3. The episode's core argument is that Ukraine's situation has deteriorated significantly since June 2024, with mobilization failing and experienced units depleted, and that this trend is more important than which US presidential administration takes office. 4. Russian forces have retaken approximately 40% of the Kursk salient Ukraine originally held, with the pocket constrained to a single main resupply road into the town of Sudzha and under continued pressure from Russian airborne units using North Korean troops as expendable infantry. 5. The southern Donetsk front, particularly the Pokrovsk operational direction, is the most unstable sector: Russian forces are advancing south of Pokrovsk to encircle the area rather than fighting for the city directly, pushing through Volhodar to Kurakove and Selidove. 6. Kaufman assesses that in the Pokrovsk area Russian forces do not have an artillery advantage — they are conducting this advance primarily with infantry attacks, mechanized assaults, and unmanned aerial systems. 7. Kaufman argues that North Korean troops are not a sign of Russian weakness: Russia is generating more than 25,000 personnel per month and 10,000-12,000 North Koreans represents roughly 3-4% of that annual requirement. 8. The North Korean force frees Russian units from Kursk to continue offensive pressure south of Donetsk, but the unresolved question is whether North Korea will agree to deploy troops into Ukraine proper beyond Russian territory. 9. A clip from Kaufman's members-only podcast 'The Russian Contingency' features his tripmates Rob and Dara raising concerns about Ukrainian morale after two and a half years of continuous high-intensity combat. 10. In June 2024, Kaufman returned optimistic: supplemental US funding had passed, ammunition was being sent, mobilization reform laws had passed, and Ukraine was posting strong mobilization numbers. 11. His most recent return produced a 'substantially corrected view': mobilization numbers have not been sustained over five months, experienced front-line brigades have been depleted rather than replenished, and the decision to create new brigades has produced units that are not combat effective. 12. Ukraine has reduced the mobilization age floor from 27 to 25 by law but has not sent anyone under 27 to the front, and further reductions are under debate; Kaufman describes this decision-making as 'halting, uncertain, and slow.' 13. A major structural problem Kaufman identifies is the absence of effective command above brigade level: brigades are largely running their own fights in some sectors, while in others senior leadership is directing them in ways Kaufman assesses as not particularly effective. 14. Ukraine's current primary battlefield advantage is drone employment: Kaufman says Ukraine has a numerical and qualitative advantage in drone systems over Russia and that this is the biggest force multiplier currently compensating for manpower deficits. 15. Kaufman warns that the drone advantage has limits: if the front-line force keeps shrinking and Ukraine cannot maintain an echelon defense with a second line, Russian forces will eventually be able to break through. 16. Kaufman assesses Ukraine can sustain the fight into 2025 but says the worst-case outcomes discussed throughout 2024 have not been avoided — they have been delayed and pushed into 2025, with the overall trajectory still negative. 17. On Trump's election, Kaufman says Ukrainians did not express dread during his pre-election visit: they view a Trump administration as at least presenting an opportunity, whereas the Biden approach represented a 'compromised' path without a theory for victory. 18. Kaufman raises the concern that the Trump transition team may arrive with no remaining Presidential Drawdown Authority funding and a deteriorating front, giving them fewer cards than expected to either support Ukraine or extract diplomatic leverage. 19. Evans closes by noting the Trump administration will face competing crises — Ukraine and the Middle East — and Kaufman uses the phrase 'which wolf is closest to the sled' to describe the prioritization challenge. 20. The episode is a dense policy and battlefield analysis conversation between two experienced analysts; listeners new to the Ukraine conflict may need background on Pokrovsk, Kursk, and the mobilization debate to follow fully.

As heard by us

A sober Ukraine war briefing on manpower shortages, battlefield pressure, and Washington's next hard choices.

War on the Rocks gives a sober, detail-heavy assessment of Ukraine's position, starting with Russian pressure around the Kursk pocket, constrained resupply near Suzha, and a stable but still contested wider front.

Read the full review in PlayNext →

Why you'd press play

Need a clear read on why Ukraine's problem is getting harder, not simpler?

Read the full recommendation in PlayNext →

Listen to the show on

Apple Podcasts Spotify

Play clips from this episode More from War on the Rocks