The Lawfare Podcast · The Lawfare Institute

Lawfare Daily: Does the U.S. Have a Drone Defense Problem?

March 11, 2026·44 min·4 clips

Why a simple drone lights up radar like a Christmas tree yet still slips through billion-dollar defenses.

This Lawfare Daily episode features two conversations about the Iranian Shahed drone threat in the Middle East and what the U.S. and its allies can learn from Ukraine's experience countering similar drones from Russia. In the first conversation, host Anastasia Lopatina speaks with Fabian Hoffman, a doctoral research fellow at the University of Oslo. Hoffman explains that the Shahed drone is a simple, large, slow-flying vehicle that is easy to detect on radar. The core problem is that Gulf states invested heavily in ballistic missile defense systems like Patriot but lack optimized, affordable interceptor systems for drones. When enough drones are launched simultaneously, some will inevitably get through even well-defended airspace. Hoffman describes a two-barrier defense system. The first barrier consists of manned aircraft, including F-15Es, F-16s, and Apache helicopters, which intercept most incoming drones using guns, Sidewinder missiles, or cheaper APKWS missiles. The second barrier is surface-to-air missile systems like Patriot, used as a last resort when drones slip through. He emphasizes that Patriot intercepts, at up to $4 million per shot against a $20,000-$30,000 drone, are the minority of interceptions, not the primary method, contrary to much social media commentary. Hoffman distinguishes between area defense, covering large territories via manned aircraft patrols, and point defense, protecting specific critical facilities with surface-to-air systems. Saudi Arabia's vast territory makes comprehensive point defense impractical, meaning some targets will remain unprotected. He notes that the U.S. and Israel have also been bombing Shahed launch trucks and underground production facilities using B-2 and B-1B bombers, though assessing damage to underground sites is difficult without human intelligence. On the offensive side, Hoffman assesses U.S. and coalition military performance as expected or slightly better than expected, with reduced Iranian launch capability suggesting successful operations against launcher infrastructure. However, he warns that translating military success into political success is a separate challenge, and treating targeting as an end in itself rather than a means to a political objective carries risk. In the second conversation, Lopatina speaks with Pavlo Litovkin, a senior Ukrainian drone instructor. Litovkin describes how Ukraine's defense against Shaheds evolved through several phases. Initially, Ukraine deployed mobile air defense groups with machine guns and trained soldiers using simulators, achieving enough success that air raid sirens became almost reassuring. When Russia adapted by flying drones higher and diving them onto targets, Ukraine's drone industry developed interceptor drones. These interceptor drones evolved from manually piloted FPV drones to autonomous systems with onboard infrared seekers. Ukrainian models like the Sting cost around $2,000, while the American-made Mareps system costs around $15,000. Both approaches work: Mareps is a fixed-wing drone launched by catapult, while Sting uses vertical multi-copter liftoff. Ukraine has also built an extensive acoustic sensor network across the country that uses AI to identify drone types and triangulate positions, feeding data into civilian air raid warning applications. Litovkin describes the interceptor drone market as dynamic and competitive, with companies from Europe, the U.S., and potentially Asia developing systems. Ukraine has already sent experts and interceptor drones to Jordan to protect American military bases. He notes that Russia continues to modify Shaheds, including versions with jet engines for higher speed, and Ukraine is trying to anticipate the next evolution. The episode concludes with Litovkin emphasizing that Ukraine's drone defense expertise was built at the cost of lives and should be shared with the world, noting that countries tend to pay attention to these problems only when the threat reaches their own borders.

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