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Lawfare Archive: Hezbollah, Lebanon, Israel, Iran

March 7, 2026·56 min·5 clips

Israel asked Hezbollah's leader if he wanted to reconsider, then decapitated the organization in devastating strikes.

This Lawfare Podcast archive episode, originally recorded October 2, 2024, is introduced by an intern who notes that U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran began on February 28, 2026, killing at least 1,045 people including Ayatollah Khamenei. The original discussion features host Benjamin Wittes with analysts Firas Maksad, Nathan Sachs, and Scott Anderson examining the Israeli escalation against Hezbollah. Firas Maksad explains that the Israel-Lebanon conflict had been largely confined to a 10-to-20-kilometer border zone until Israel launched the pager operation, which disabled Hezbollah communications devices, followed by walkie-talkie attacks and then airstrikes targeting the organization's military command, culminating in the killing of Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. Maksad notes that a senior IRGC commander died alongside Nasrallah in the same bunker. Scott Anderson raises questions about the sequencing. He cites Axios reporting that Israel may have initiated the pager operation because Hezbollah was about to discover the compromise, making it a use-it-or-lose-it decision rather than the opening of a planned campaign. He notes the ground operation did not follow for nearly a week, giving Hezbollah time to reassemble — an unusual delay if the sequence was premeditated. Nathan Sachs argues the war plans had been prepared for 18 years since the 2006 Lebanon conflict, and the intelligence successes against Hezbollah contrast sharply with the catastrophic intelligence failure on October 7 in Gaza. He attributes this disparity to Israel's long-standing strategic focus on the northern front. Sachs emphasizes that the political demand from tens of thousands of displaced northern Israelis created an imperative any Israeli leader would have had to address. Maksad provides a critical reassessment of Nasrallah, arguing that despite his charismatic reputation, he committed two major strategic blunders: the 2006 cross-border kidnapping that triggered a devastating war, and the decision to open a support front after October 7 while repeatedly assuring his Shia base they would not be dragged into full conflict. Both decisions ended in outcomes he had promised to avoid. The panelists discuss Lebanese domestic politics, noting that a million internally displaced people — mostly pro-Hezbollah Shia — are seeking shelter in areas hostile to their politics. The Lebanese army is focused on preventing internal tensions rather than opposing any Israeli incursion. Political elites are waiting for signals from Washington and regional capitals before making moves. On the Iranian missile barrage against Israel, Sachs notes that this second direct attack used faster ballistic missiles with less warning time than the April strike, though damage appeared minimal. He warns of a mood shift in Israel from post-October 7 trauma to a potentially dangerous sense of omnipotence following the Hezbollah successes. The discussion closes with analysis of Netanyahu's political position. Sachs argues Netanyahu survives not from rising poll numbers but from coalition partners' fear of losing seats in an election. His lack of political shame — surviving an indictment and the October 7 failure without resigning — has become a structural political advantage.

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