Branches of Philosophy Podcast · Philosophy Cognitive Science

[212] The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality By Angela A. Mendelovici

August 25, 2025·43 min·1 clip

What if intentionality is identical to consciousness itself?

This episode explores the philosophical concept of intentionality, guided by Angela Mendelovici's book *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality*. The hosts unpack Mendelovici's radical thesis that intentionality—the "aboutness" of mental states—is identical to phenomenal consciousness. They trace the modern discussion of intentionality back to Franz Brentano, who described it as the "intentional inexistence" of an object within a mental act. Mendelovici grounds the discussion by defining intentionality ostensively, pointing to the direct, introspective experience of "of-ness" in thoughts and perceptions. She distinguishes original intentionality, the foundational source of meaning, from derived intentionality, which applies to symbols like stop signs. Mendelovici critiques tracking theories, which propose intentionality arises from causal relations to the world, by highlighting a fundamental mismatch problem. For example, our visual experience represents a simple "Edenic" blue, not the complex surface reflectance profiles our visual system tracks. This mismatch extends to concepts like the self, where we represent ourselves as a simple, enduring "I" rather than the complex biological entity we track. She further argues tracking relations suffer from a "real problem," illustrated by the submarine navigator analogy: mere correlation does not make content subjectively present. Functional role theories, which tie content to a representation's role within a cognitive system, face a content indeterminacy problem exemplified by the "swapping argument." Mendelovici's solution is the Phenomenal Intentionality Theory (PIT), which posits that original intentionality is identical to phenomenal consciousness. On this view, the subjective feel of seeing blue *is* its aboutness, elegantly dissolving the mismatch problem. For complex thoughts, she introduces "self-ascriptivism," where simple phenomenal "tags" derivatively represent rich contents via dispositions to have "cashing-out" thoughts. Standing beliefs are handled dispositionally, while non-conscious neural processes are seen as merely carrying information, not genuine intentionality. Mendelovici ultimately advocates for an "aspect view," where content is an intrinsic feature of mental states, avoiding the "inventory problem" of relating to non-existent entities like Santa Claus. The tone is conversational and educational, carefully building from intuitive examples to complex philosophical arguments. Listeners interested in philosophy of mind, consciousness studies, or foundational questions about thought and meaning will find this episode deeply engaging. Those seeking practical self-help or narrative storytelling might find the abstract, analytical discussion less compelling.

As heard by us

A clear look at why mental states still resist easy explanations of aboutness.

Angela Mendelovici's The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality takes on a hard question: how thoughts, perceptions, and dreams can be about anything at all.

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Why you'd press play

For the moment you want to understand why thoughts, perceptions, and even dreams seem directed at something.

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